To approach Descartes' contemporaries not only in so far as they could have been intellectual sources of his thought, but as his peers and colleagues with whom it was not only possible, but also inevitable, that he engaged with in intellectual discussions has wide consequences. Minores-those "mostly unknown, bizarre-sounding scholastics and Cartesians" (Ariew 2014, p. vi) -are to be studied for their own sake. The historian has to read the heavy repetitive volumes that they wrote, or rather, reading these books, she learns to see differences where she previously saw only boring repetitions of one and the same doctrine. Ariew was one of the first scholars to insist on the differences between Scotism and Thomism during the early modern period, and DFC presents new arguments to support the thesis that, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, French, or at least Parisian, scholastics were more Scotist than we had been used to thinking since Étienne Gilson first published his Index scolastico-cartésien in 1913 (Ariew 2011, p. 45; Ariew 2014, pp. 4-13, 15-7) .
But DFC not only revisits interesting stuff, it also presents new material and does so in a new way. To put it bluntly, there are at least two novelties in DFC. First, it takes into account not only scholastics, but, as the very title of the book indicates, the "First Cartesians": Ariew's heroes here are Jacques Du Roure, Antoine Le Grand, and Pierre-Sylvain Régis. At this point, however, one might object that, even without taking into account luminaries such as Spinoza, Huygens, or Leibniz, who were too singular to be merely categorized as Cartesians, there were other Cartesians around in the second half of the seventeenth century. "Cartesian" was in this period an actor's category: Géraud de Cordemoy, Jacques Rohault, Nicolas Poisson, Louis de la Forge, Jean-Baptiste Denis, or Bernard Lamy were obviously identified as Cartesians both by Cartesians themselves and by their scholastic enemies. Ariew does discuss them occasionally. Still, although they were among the first Cartesians from a chronological point of view, they are not at the center of Ariew's story in the same way as the triumvirate of Jacques Du Roure, Antoine Le Grand, and Pierre-Sylvain Régis is.
And this is because of the second novelty of DFC, which amounts to highlighting the idea that philosophy should be presented in textbooks, that is, as summae quadripartitae. Because of this idea, Ariew applies the category "First Cartesians" not so much to the Cartesians who were the first to follow Descartes' doctrine from a chronological point of view, as to those who were the first to carry out Descartes' unfinished project of writing a textbook in Latin.
1 As is well known, by the end of 1640, Descartes Descartes 1996, vol. 3, pp. 233, 259, 276, 782) . But he always insisted that, in order to be taught, his philosophy should be shortened and presented "in order (par ordre)"-as if he was now judging that his previous writings had no order, or at least, recognizing that his order was not everyone's order.
2 And, even if he considered once the possibility of calling his textbook summa philosophiae, there is no evidence that he ever wanted to extend it further than metaphysics and physics: on the contrary, he presents it as a Latinized version of Le monde: "Mon Monde se fera bientost voir au monde, & je croy que ce seroit des à present, sinon que je veux auparavant luy faire aprendre à parler latin; & je le feray nommer summa Philosophiae, affin qu'il s'introduyse plus aysement en la conversation des gens de l'escole" (Descartes 1996, vol. 3, p. 782) . Still, Ariew argues, the book that resulted from this projectPrincipia philosophiae-was inadequate for teaching philosophy because it did not include logic and ethics; it was incomplete when compared to regular scholastic textbooks. Hence, the task of the "First Cartesians" would have been to write the Cartesian textbook that Descartes had never written and to write it in a form acceptable to their scholastic contemporaries, that is, to write a summa quadripartita (Ariew 2014, pp. ix-xi and passim) . Desmond Clarke once captured the tendency of Cartesians to behave as sectarians who follow an intellectual Master rather than the truth by speaking of "Scholastic Cartesianism" (Clarke 1989, pp. 222-44) .
3 According to Ariew, Cartesians are not scholastic because of their blind obedience to Descartes; on the contrary they introduced some variations and innovations with respect to Descartes' doctrine (Ariew 2014, pp. 206-09, passim) . But they are scholastics because they wrote books that belong to the genre of summa quadripartita.
Summa quadripartita as a genre indeed shapes the construction of DFC. DAS was a collection of papers that were all written with similar methodological commitments, but that were thematically independent one from the other. On the contrary, DFC is quite systematically constructed as a succession of different summae quadripartitae. A first introductory chapter contrasts Thomism and Scotism, asks the question of what was taught by the different Orders in France, and presents Descartes' changing attitudes to the Jesuits, the Oratorians and the Doctrinaires. Each of the three following chapters is devoted to the different types of text that included similarly titled doctrines: the early seventeenth-century French Aristotelian textbooks in the second chapter, Descartes' own tree of philosophy in the third chapter, and, finally, Cartesian systems in the fourth chapter. 4 Since each of these three chapters is divided according to the four canonical parts of summae quadripartitae-logic, metaphysics, physics, and ethics, albeit obviously following a different order depending on whether one is a scholastic or a Cartesian (Ariew 2014, pp. xiv, xix, n. 19 )-, DFC can be read following either the succession of types of text or the succession of philosophical domains.
Regardless of the manner in which one chooses to read it, it is quite precious to be able to count on a tool that helps us to draw systematic comparisons between Descartes, the scholastics and the Cartesians. One of the many stimulating aspects of DFC has nothing to do with systematicity, though: this is the fact that, at almost every page, we get a glimpse at small figures previously unmentioned-so that, instead of contemplating from afar only a few unapproachable peaks that would tower above a flat desert, we stroll about in a region full of higher and lower hills, deeper and larger valleys. To say it in less poetic terms, DFC includes a lot of information about the circulation of Descartes' texts and about the construction of Descartes' doctrine as a canonical doctrine, but also about less known philosophers, about the doctrines that they held, and about the editions of the books that they published. One of the interesting points that Ariew makes concerning logic is that, by the end of the century, Cartesians and Scholastics converged to write quadripartite logics based on conception, judgment, consequence, and method (Ariew 2014, p. 165) . Being not myself a metaphysician by nature, I learned a lot about univocity and equivocity (Ariew 2014, pp. 51, 57, 100-02, 117-20, 177-79) and about the different early modern theories of distinctions (Ariew 2014, pp. 101-02, 113-22, 165-66, 177-78) . Many fascinating points would be worth pursuing. Before coming to broader issues, I would like to pick up and discuss two minor claims, the one concerning physics, the other concerning ethics.
In the section devoted to Descartes' physics, Ariew rightly argues that this physics has little to do with the discourses about the mathematization of the world-picture that were fashionable in Edwin Arthur Burtt's and Alexandre Koyré's times (Ariew 2014, pp. 131-37, 187-90) . It would be difficult for me not to agree: Ariew refers to the introduction I wrote for a special issue of Early Science and Medicine, in which I argued that, even if we did not believe anymore in the big picture of the Scientific Revolution, there was still much work to be done about what "mathematization" implied for different authors in the Medieval, Renaissance, and Early Modern Period (Roux 2010) . However, I would like to qualify one of the three claims defended in the section "Hypotheses and Moral Certainty" of Ariew's third chapter. Here are these claims: " (1 Rome is, moral certainty should not be equated with high probability" (Ariew 2014, pp. 143-44) . I completely agree with the two first claims, but I would like to qualify the third one. If I understood it well, Ariew's main argument in favor of this claim is not conceptual, but historical. Conceptually, one could believe that the examples brought out by Descartes in Principia philosophiae IV 205-believing that a code was broken and that there is a city called Roma in Italy-admit of degrees of certainty and that the probability that such beliefs are true is higher if a longer code was broken or if we can rely on a greater number of testimonies that Roma is an Italian city. But, says Ariew, moral certainty does not admit of degrees: it would have been, for Descartes as for the Scholastics, an absolute entity, since certainty and probability were separated as demonstrative science and probable opinion.
Indeed, the distinction between certainty and probability was such a strong distinction that Descartes and most of the Cartesians never felt completely free to admit that they were advancing only probable hypotheses (Clarke 1989, pp. 183-200, 229-32, 243-44) . However, as has been established by Sven K. Knebel (Knebel 2000 and Knebel 2003) , in the context of post-Tridentine theology, Jesuits from the early seventeenth century proposed a distinction between three types of possibility, which was quickly applied to other notions, such as causality, freedom, indifference, evidence, and certainty. The thirteenth century had established a distinction between, on the one hand, the possibile physice, physical power, and, on the other, the possibile metaphysice, logice or mathematice, defined by the conceivability or at least the non-contradiction of the terms of the proposition at stake. A second distinction was added in the early seventeenth century, the distinction between possibile physice and possibile morale, where the former is the power that a being has in general to do or not to do something, while the latter is that power in so far as it can be associated with extrinsic circumstances that favor its actualization or, on the contrary, hinder it-in other words, that power in so far as it is sometimes actualized. Moreover, in so far as the moral possibility is sometimes actualized but sometimes not, it is capable of some quantification; the Jesuit texts use an eloquent analogy with a dice game in order to illustrate the difference between what is physically possible (all the possible outcomes of a set of dices) and what is morally possible (the outcome that finally obtains when the dices are rolled). As such, this distinction would have brought forward a statistical conception of modalities, which would constitute the conceptual womb in which the theory of probabilities developed (Knebel 2000, pp. 148-56; Roux 2011, 95-8, shows that Mariotte adapted the distinction between three kinds of possible to physics). To say it in a word, Knebel established that the distinction between moral certainty and physical certainty was formed in a context where the analogy with dice games implied some quantification, that is, some degrees. It is in this sense that Ariew's claim that, historically, moral certainty admits of no degree and is not to be equated with high probability, should be qualified.
To turn now to ethics, Ariew shows quite convincingly the role that Claude Clerselier's edition of Descartes' letters played in the elaboration of a Cartesian ethics (Ariew 2014, pp. 153-56) . But I would like to discuss the claim that "the Cartesians created a Neo-Stoic ethics" (Ariew 2014, pp. 206-07, 209 ). Descartes himself entertained subtle relations to Stoic ethics, which indeed underwent a striking revival in the seventeenth century (Ariew 2014 , pp. 150-51, but also Lagrée 1994 , Lagrée 2010 Descartes 1996, vol. 4, pp. 253, 263-68, 277) . But, in the first part of the Discourse on Method, Descartes criticized the Stoics because "they do not adequately explain how to recognize a virtue, and often what they call by this fine name is nothing but a case of callousness, or vanity, or desesperation, or parricide" (Descartes 1988, vol. 1, p. 114) . If Descartes' precise relation to Stoicism is indisputably debatable, Le Grand's case is more straightforward. Before his conversion to Cartesianism, Le Grand wrote two successful ethics books in French (Le Grand 1662 and Le Grand 1669; there were many reprints of these books, some of them with slightly different titles). The first of these books, which was extremely popular, defended the theses that wise human beings can live without passions, because passions are not natural to them and do not help them to develop their virtues. After his conversion to Cartesianism, however, Le Grand changed his mind on passions so that he explicitly distanced himself from the doctrine that he had exposed in his former book: My point is obvious: if Le Grand thought that his former Stoic beliefs and his more recent Cartesian beliefs on passions were not compatible, is it legitimate to call his doctrine "neo-Stoic"?
I may have qualifications to make and questions to ask, but they are obviously dependent on the many things that Ariew taught me to see and understand. In the following, I would like to put DFC, or at least its last chapter on Cartesians, in a somewhat broader perspective. It cannot be denied that there were some Cartesians who wrote books organized as summae quadripartitae and that some of these books were intended for teaching. One should be grateful to Ariew for having explored these books in such detail, as well as other books written by Cartesians. However, it seems to me that Ariew's scholastic perspective leads him to entangle teaching Cartesianism and writing summae on the one hand, and on the other writing summae and writing systems. In the last part of my discussion, I would like to disentangle these different elements and ask the two following questions: First, while Descartes insisted that some order should be introduced in his philosophy if it was to be taught in the schools, what has such an order to do with the presentation of philosophy as a system or as a summa quadripartita? Second, what did teaching philosophy mean for Descartes and his followers?
It is precisely in the second half of the seventeenth century, while Ariew's Cartesians were busy writing their summae, that our notion of a system was elaborated. The term "system" is attested in French since 1552. Until the mid-seventeenth century, it referred, as its Latin equivalent "systema," to the cosmological order of the planets, or, more rarely, in music, to a sequence of intervals (Ricken 1979) . During the second half of the seventeenth century, its use spread and it began to designate any kind of order and disposition. As Bouhours noted in his Remarques nouvelles sur la Langue française:
Il y a quelques années, que ce mot n'estoit connu en notre langue que des philosophes et des mathématiciens; c'était un mot d'art en quelque sorte, le système du monde, le système de Copernic. Depuis que M. de la Chambre a fait le système de l'âme, on s'est accoutumé à ce mot, & comme il signifie proprement constitution & situation, on s'en est servi dans le figuré, pour exprimer bien des choses. (Bouhours 1675, pp. 57-8) 5 Furetière, after mentioning the use of "sistème" in astronomy, notes in his Dictionnaire that it is also used in physics and in medicine:
On appelle aussi en Physique le sisteme des sens, du mouvement, de la nourriture, &c., la manière dont on suppose & on conçoit que ces organes sont disposes. Entre les Medecins il y en a qui suivent le sisteme des saveurs; l'autre qui suivent le sisteme des quatre qualités, d'autre le sisteme des acides et des alcalis. Ce Medecin fait un nouveau sisteme des fièvres. (Furetière 1690, article "sistème") Régis himself, in the dictionary that he inserted at the end of the first volume of his Physique, has an entry "physics," where he gives a general definition of a system: "ce qui fait qu'une chose agit d'une certaine manière en vertu de sa composition et des dispositions qui font sa nature." Like Furetière, he mentions not only the systems of the world, but also, the system of the senses, the system of motion, and the system of food. Interestingly enough though, he ends his entry with a comparison between a hypothesis and a system, which implies that the word "system" does not only refer to the structure and composition of things, but, also, 5. In his Préface, Cureau de la Chambre 1664 justified indeed the title of this book in the following way: "Je n'ai pû trouver de terme qui expliquast bien mon dessein, que le mot de Systeme. Car de luy donner pour titre Discours de la Nature de l'Ame, il est esté trop vague.
[…] De luy donner aussi celuy des Actions de l'Ame, il eust esté trop resseré.
[…] De sorte que apres avoir remarqué que les Astronomes en faisant le Systeme du Monde, qui n'est autre chose que l'ordre & la disposition qu'ils donnent à tous les corps dont le Monde est composé, n'examinent point la nature de ces corps-là, et ne cherchent que leur situation, leur figure, leur grandeur & leurs mouvemens, j'ai creû que je pouvois emprunter d'eux ce terme-là, puisque j'avois les mêmes visées pour le regard de l'Ame." to propositions that are ordered in such a way that they compose a coherent whole: "L'Hypothèse est un Système plus particulier, et le Système une Hypothèse plus générale, ou, pour mieux dire, le Système n'est qu'un composé de plusieurs Hypothèses" (art. "système," in Régis 1690, vol. 1, n.p.). It is however in the Avertissement that opens his Physique that Régis gives the most precise definition of this new meaning of "système": "Nous entendons par SYSTÈME non une seule hypothèse, mais un amas de plusieurs hypothèses, dépendantes les unes des autres et tellement liées avec les premières vérités qu'elles en soient comme des suites et des dépen-dances nécessaires." (Régis 1690, vol. I, pp. 275-76) . 6 Here, Régis could have taken inspiration from Descartes: there are several passages where Descartes, as a duelist who would challenge his enemy, exclaimed that if this or that proposition is false, then the whole of his philosophy is false. Though Descartes may have borrowed the image of a tree from Abra de Raconis and transferred it from physics to the whole of philosophy, I am not sure that Abra de Raconis ever stressed the coherence of his propositions in such a radical and bellicose way.
To sum up, the word "système," which was used mainly with reference to the disposition of the planets, began in the seventeenth century to designate the disposition of anything, including, in the case of a Cartesian like Régis, the order and disposition of propositions in a book. Ariew is not concerned with such new meanings. And that's because he does not believe that his heroes formulated systems in the sense of consistent sets of propositions depending on a few basic tenets. With a fully British sense of understatement, Ariew notes that "in his 1654 Philosophy, Du Roure tries to follow an order sketched by Descartes, though he does not integrate all the materials completely" (Ariew 2014, p. 161) , that "despite his enthusiasm […] Du Roure's Morale, like his Logique, gives the impression of something that has not fully come together" (Ariew 2014, p. 195) , or, still, that Régis' Système général "is a very odd work […] [which] does not seem very systematic" (Ariew 2014, p. xii) . I could not find any similar quotations concerning Le Grand, but he surely does not fare better. Still, the fact that Du Roure, Régis, and Le Grand failed to be systematic does not imply that they had not the intention of being systematic, to wit, of proposing a coherent set of hypotheses depending on a few basic tenets. In the case of Régis at least, this was quite important, since he thought-it is immaterial here to know if he was justified to think so-that the difference between the arbitrary hypotheses advanced by Claude Perrault in his Essays de physique and his own true hypotheses in physics was precisely that his 6. The relation between hypothesis and system is discussed in Clarke 1989, pp. 215-21. hypotheses were organized in a system. The Avertissement I already quoted goes on in the following way:
Ce qui [i.e., that all the hypotheses are like necessary consequences of first truths] ne sçauroit convenir aux hypotheses purement arbitraires, telles que sont celles de la plus-part des Philosophes modernes. Il n'y a rien de plus commun que les hypotheses arbitraires […] . Il n'en est pas de meme des systèmes que des hypotheses arbitraires […] . Nous nous servirons donc comme les autres, du droit de faire des hypotheses […] . Mais pour n'en établir que d'exactes, nous ferons ensorte qu'elles dependent absolument des premières verités. (Régis 1690, vol. I, p. 276) Thus, Régis' Système général can be seen as a summa quadripartita, but it can also be read as a system of hypotheses that are presented as true because they depend on first truths and form a coherent whole. Consequently, it seems to me that we could conjecture that the first Cartesians contributed to forge our notion of a system, not so much because they wrote summae quadripartitae, as because they tried both to establish the supremacy of their works over works like Perrault's Essays and to answer the criticisms about framing hypotheses that were addressed to them. In any case, it is interesting to note that what Descartes described as presenting his philosophy "in order" gave way to at least two interpretations that were different but not incompatible: on the one hand, it meant complying with the order of domains and disciplines that was canonical in summae quadripartitatae; on the other hand, it meant insisting on the coherence of all the propositions together.
To conclude my discussion of DFC, I would like to insist that studying scholastic textbooks and Cartesian systems should not make us forget that Descartes and his followers raised wide-ranging questions about the teaching of philosophy-namely, where, how, by whom and to whom was philosophy to be taught? First, let us come back to Descartes himself. As I have already noted, Ariew's project finds its origins in the letters where, by the end of 1640, Descartes formulated the project of presenting his philosophy in such a way that it could be taught in the Schools, which meant to shorten it, order it differently, and to put it in Latin. These are important letters for understanding the genesis of Descartes' Principia philosophiae. However, these are not the only things that Descartes wrote about how his philosophy could be taught; he seems to have been especially careful to delineate the kind of readers and students whom he was addressing himself to.
On the one hand, he asserted that his writings might be read virtually by everybody. Thus, in a letter to Vatier, Descartes explained that in Discours de la méthode, he did not dare to explain in detail why our beliefs concerning material beings can be subject to doubt, because "these thoughts did not seem to me suitable for inclusion in a book which I wished to be intelligible in part even to women" (Descartes to Vatier, 22 February 1638 , in Descartes 1988 . On the other hand, he insisted that his readers should not be excessively learned. For example, at the very beginning of La recherche de la vérité, he explained that an honnête homme "is not required to have read absolutely every book or diligently mastered everything that is taught in the Schools. It would, indeed, be a kind of defect in his education if he had spent too much time in booklearning (en l'exercice des lettres)" (La recherche de la vérité, in Descartes 1996 , vol. 10, p. 495, transl. in Descartes 1988 , to be compared with the criticism of those who spent all their time in schools that appears in Descartes 1996, vol. 10, p. 371) . In other words, Descartes was at the same time encouraging those who may have hesitated to approach his writings because they were uneducated and insisting that, in the case of those who were well educated, all their learning was not enough. The condition sine qua non was in both cases to be ready to spend time, care, and attention enough in perusing Descartes' books. In the Lettre-Préface to Principes de la philosophie, he rehearsed the idea:
I should like to assure those who are over-diffident about their powers that there is nothing in my writings which they are not capable of completely understanding provided that they take the trouble to examine them. I would, however, also like to warn the others that even the most excellent minds will need a great deal of time and attention in order to look at all the things which I set myself to include. (Descartes 1988, vol. 1, p. 185) My point here is not to play Descartes the honnête homme against Descartes the scholastic. Being not a Martin Schoock rediviva, neither is it to claim that Descartes wanted us to stop reading books. (According to Schook's Admiranda Methodus, Descartes required his disciples to forget all the books and the whole tradition of learning in order to submit themselves to Descartes as to their master, see Verbeek 1988, pp. 189, 197 and passim. But, in fact, if Descartes condemned those who spend too much time studying books, he did not, for that, condemn reading books in general.) But I think that Descartes' description of his ideal readers may have contributed to making it possible that philosophy reached other audiences than the captive audience of boisterous students locked in collèges de plein exercice and universities.
And some French Cartesians may have realized this possibility. Among Cartesians, there were not only university professors, but also authors and monitors, as Malebranche would have put it, worldly experimentalists like Jacques Rohault, and, further, polished conversationalists like Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle. 7 Many testimonies indicate that, from the sixties on, the teaching of Cartesian philosophy in France was far from being confined to the regular teaching institutions. Rather, it was taught in conférences or private academies and discussed in salons. The description that the Cartesian Clerselier gives of the audience of Rohault's Mercredis-"people of all stations and conditions, prelates, abbots, courtesans, doctors, physicians, philosophers, geometers, regents, schoolboys, provincials, foreigners, artisans, in a word, people of all ages, sex and profession" (Clerselier, 1682, n.p.) 8 -concords with one of the many reproaches that the Doctrinaire Jean Vincent made to Toulouse's Cartesians, among which the most famous one was Pierre-Sylvain Régis: "they divulge to all kind of human beings, kids, adults, men, women, the doctrine that in the Schools used to be diffused to only a few men" (Vincent 1677, IV, sect. 526, p. 521) . 9 The difference between Clerselier and Vincent is that the former gives credit to this kind of mixed and motley audience, while the latter would have liked to discredit it completely. But both agree that, because of Cartesians, philosophy reached new audiences.
Thus, in late seventeenth-century France, honnêtes gens, among whom some women who were learned but not specialized, able to read short philosophy books but not ready to spend time on heavy summae, good Christians but not furious theologians, were the ones to be convinced.
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It seems to me that, by focusing on the genre of summae quadripartitae and, thus, implicitly, on the official teaching of philosophy that took place in collèges de plein exercice and universities, Ariew sometimes misses what he himself called in DAS the "intellectual milieu" in which controversies continuously emerged between Cartesians, Scholastics, and even other species of philosophers in France by the end of the seventeenth century, an "intellectual milieu" that, some fifty years afterwards, was already different from the intellectual milieu in which Descartes himself worked. To put it more precisely, if Ariew's point is to describe the variety of Cartesian doctrines at the end of the seventeenth century, especially in as much as they paradoxically appeared in the scholastic form of a summa, I cannot but repeat that I admire without any reserve the fine-grained description that he succeeded in giving of such a doctrinal variety in such a short volume. But, when 7. For a study of the various social figures of the philosopher, see Ribard 2000. 8. Other sources attest to the fact that a certain number of persons of quality, young students (for example Pierre-Sylvain Régis) and women (for example Madame de Bonneveaux or Madame de Guerderville) attended Rohault's lectures.
9. Fontenelle 1994, pp. 143-44, explains that Régis' success was such that the magistrates of the city awarded him a pension.
10. This is one of the things that I tried to show in Roux 2012.
Le Grand was more important than Du Roure. Perhaps because his Institutio philosophiae had been the object of a quite brief notice in Journal des scavants on 20 February 1679, and because he was known by Pierre Bayle, the Jesuit Louis Le Valois, and Antoine Arnauld. Bayle alluded to Le Grand in a letter to his brother Jacob Bayle (Bayle 1679) ; in the article "Rorarius" of the Dictionnaire historique et critique, he mentioned among other Cartesian publications concerning animal machines Le Grand's Dissertatio de carentia sensus & cognitionis in brutis (Bayle 1715, p. 442) ; finally, in his Système abrégé de philosophie he made a reference to Le Grand's physics (Bayle 1737, p. 426) . Le Valois and Arnauld cite him in passing (Arnauld 1781, p. 150; Le Valois 1680, I, chap. 4, p. 84) . What these authors write when they mention him seems to indicate that, except for Bayle, they had not read him and that it was difficult to know exactly who he was. His audience was not French, but English: he lived in England from the age of 27 to his death; except for the three books that he published in French before his conversion to Cartesianism, he published in Latin or English; he dedicated the different editions of his Institutio to the Academici Cantabrigiensis universitatis; finally, it is to be noted that he engaged controversies only with English philosophers, to wit Samuel Parker and John Sergeant. In a word, Le Grande was no more important than Du Roure for the diffusion of Cartesianism in France.
As for Régis, he was indeed quite important, even if not as important as Rohault. But although he had a long career as a public teacher and personal preceptor, contrary to Le Grand who wrote the Institutio "in usum juventutis Academicae," he does not seem to have published his Système général for students, and in any case he never studied in collèges or universities.
In a word, studying Du Roure, Le Grand, and Régis is interesting in itself and challenging as such. But, beyond that, understanding their "intellectual milieu" would imply to differentiate the French context of the forties, in which Descartes himself made his works known, from the French context of the fifties and early sixties, in which Du Roure published some of his books in his own house; further, to distinguish those two contexts from the French context of the eighties and nineties, in which Régis published a Cartesian textbook while the Académie des sciences was flourishing; and, finally, to set apart those three contexts from the English context, where, thanks to Recusant families, a Catholic missionary like Le Grand could survive in an overtly anti-Catholic England.
Ariew concludes his introduction with the following words: "Much work remains to be done; as Descartes would have said: I leave this task to my 'nephews'-and to my nieces too, of course. I just hope to have provided an initial path into these complex materials" (Ariew 2014, p. xix) . He may be wrong as regards these last words: he did much more than "providing an initial path," he opened many new paths for us all. But he is definitively right when he underlines that much work remains to be done to understand the complex reception of Descartes in France and elsewhere.
